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Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of proxy voting results perceived by some investors to
have been influenced by conflicts of interest. The proxy advisory industry operates as a duopoly, with
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis estimated to hold a combined market share of
97%. These firms primarily sell voting recommendations on proxy proposals to institutional investors.
However, ISS has a subsidiary, ISS Corporate Solutions, that sells consulting services to corporations
seeking assistance with proposals to be presented to shareholders. Glass Lewis does not have a similar
business. This paper examines the stock market reaction to voting outcomes in favor of management
where ISS fully supported management and Glass Lewis did not. This paper finds that the excess return
on the meeting date for this voting outcome is statistically negative, decreasing shareholder value, on
average, by 0.15% (t-stat= -1.914). This significant negative excess returns is observed only on the
meeting date; no estimate of excess returns within a trading week (-4 trading days, +4 trading days) of the
meeting were statistically different from zero. Further, an ANOVA indicated none of the 7 other voting
outcomes exhibited significant excess returns. A regression analysis comparing this “Conflict” scenario
with a clustered group of all other voting outcomes shows a negative effect that is not statistically
significant.
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Abstract

This paper examines the economic consequences of proxy voting results perceived by some
investors to have been influenced by conflicts of interest. The proxy advisory industry operates
as a duopoly, with Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis estimated to hold a
combined market share of 97%. These firms primarily sell voting recommendations on proxy
proposals to institutional investors. However, ISS has a subsidiary, ISS Corporate Solutions, that
sells consulting services to corporations seeking assistance with proposals to be presented to
shareholders. Glass Lewis does not have a similar business. This paper examines the stock
market reaction to voting outcomes in favor of management where ISS fully supported
management and Glass Lewis did not. This paper finds that the excess return on the meeting
date for this voting outcome is statistically negative, decreasing shareholder value, on average,
by 0.15% (t-stat= -1.914). This significant negative excess returns is observed only on the
meeting date; no estimate of excess returns within a trading week (-4 trading days, +4 trading
days) of the meeting were statistically different from zero. Further, an ANOVA indicated none
of the 7 other voting outcomes exhibited significant excess returns. A regression analysis
comparing this “Conflict” scenario with a clustered group of all other voting outcomes shows a
negative effect that is not statistically significant.
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Introduction
Proxy Voting Explained

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires corporations to hold an annual
stockholders’ meeting. At these meetings, shareholders of the firm have the opportunity to vote
on a “variety of key issues that could potentially affect the corporations’ value, such as the
election of directors, executive compensation packages, and proposed mergers and acquisitions,
as well as other, more routine, issues that may not affect value, such as approving an auditor and
changing a corporate name.”1 Corporations send a proxy statement that allows shareholders to 1)
view the upcoming meeting’s voting issues and 2) appoint a third party (proxy) to vote on the
shareholder’s behalf. Shareholders may direct the third party on how to vote on each issue,
typically: ‘For’ or ‘Against’ or ‘Abstain’.

A sample proxy card can be found on the following page:

.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS 6
(June 2007)
1
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Rise of Proxy firms from 2003 SEC rule 30b1-4

In 2003, the SEC mandated that institutional investors vote on all matters on the corporate proxy
and disclose their voting policies.2 This rule created several challenges for institutional investor.
Mutual funds typically have substantially large portfolios that make thoroughly researching
every voting issue for all holdings an arduous task. Moreover, most proxy voting ballots are
routine and mundane, having negligible effect on shareholder value. Also, free-rider problems
are abound because should one mutual fund rigorously analyze a ballot and conclude its effect on
shareholder value, the fund is incented to advocate for or against the ballot to other shareholders.
The other shareholders do not incur any costs, but they reap just as much in benefits. These
issues led to substantial growth in the proxy advisory firm industry. For a subscription fee, proxy
advisory firms sell research reports and voting recommendations to institutional investors. Proxy
firms appealed to institutional investors by alleviating tedious work, lessening free-rider issues,
and, importantly, helping mutual funds demonstrate that they acted with appropriate diligence.
The SEC allows institutional investors to satisfy their fiduciary obligations by relying on proxy
advisory firms.3 In 2004, according to Harvard Law School’s record of a letter, the SEC
establishes that a “third party proxy advisory firm could be considered independent even though
it receives compensation from an issuer for separately providing the issuer advice on corporate
governance issues.”4 Institutional investors have significant influence over shareholder voting, as
some estimate they own approximately 70% of all publicly traded equity shares5. All of these

Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Investment
Company Act Release No. 25,739, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 274 (Sept. 20, 2002).
3
Ibid.
2

“Cydney Posner and Cooley LLP, SEC No-Action Letters Related to Proxy Advisory Firms, September 15, 2018,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/15/sec-no-action-letters-related-to-proxy-advisory-firms/)
5
James R. Copland and Rafael A. Mangual, “Proxy Advisory Firms: Empirical Evidence and the Case for Reform,”
Manhattan Institute, January 23, 2020, https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/proxy-advisory-firms-empiricalevidence-and-case-reform-11253.html)
4
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trends lead to the de facto concentration of voting power in two companies, Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis (GL), proxy advisory firms that hold an estimated
combined market share of 97%.6

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), and ISS Corporate Solutions (ICS)
ISS is the oldest and most prominent proxy advisory firm. According to some researchers “ISS claims
over 1,700 institutional clients managing $26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual funds,

James K. Glassman and Hester Peirce, “How Proxy Advisory Services Became So Powerful,” Mercatus on Policy
Series, Mercatus Center at George Mason University (June 18, 2014).
6
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25 of the top 25 asset managers and 17 of the top 25 public pension funds.”7 ISS is unique from its
counterpart Glass Lewis in one significant way: rather than solely advising investors on corporate
governance matters, ISS provides “governance counseling” to an undisclosed list of corporate issuers.
This practice has led many investors, regulators, and politicians to claim ISS is subject to conflicts of
interest.

Influence of Proxy Advisors

Researchers have documented the extraordinary influence proxy advisors have on shareholder
voting decisions. Choi, Fisch, and Kahan identify that “an ISS recommendation shifts 6%-10%
of shareholder votes.”8 In another paper, the same scholars note that ISS has been described the
as: “exercising ‘tremendous clout,’9 wielding ‘extraordinary’ influence,10 getting ‘[w]hatever [it]
wants,11 and being able to sway up to 30 percent of the vote in any particular proxy contest.12”13

In 2012, an Exxon Mobil executive commented “proxy advisors hold a position of unparalleled
influence” and that “between 20%–25% of the votes cast at ExxonMobil’s most recent annual
meeting were voted automatically in accordance with proxy advisor recommendations”14 ISS
disagrees with this kind of characterization of the firm’s power, claiming “there are no artificial

Choi et al., “Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors,” SSRN, August 16, 2008,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1225963)
8
Choi et al., “The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?,” SSRN, October 20, 2010,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694535)
9
Dennis K. Berman & Joann S. Lublin, Advisor ISS Puts Itself on Sale, Could Fetch Up to
$500 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at C4.
10
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2006, § 3, at 6.
11
William J. Holstein, Is ISS Too Powerful? And Whose Interests Does It Serve?, BNET: THE
CORNER OFFICE, Feb. 7, 2008, http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=1100&tag=content;col1.
12
Id
13
Choi et al., “Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors,” SSRN, August 16, 2008,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1225963)
14
Rosenthal DS (2012) Comment on the concept release on the U.S.
proxy system, nos. 34-62495; IA-3052; IC-293.
7
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barriers into the proxy advisory industry in the United States,” the company “operate[s] in a
competitive market”, and “institutional investors are not required to purchase [their] services.”15

Concerns about Proxy Advisors

As the proxy advisory market has grown dramatically, so too have the concerns about the
industry. Copland et.al note the widespread distrust of the industry by illustrating that “[c]ritics
of the proxy advisory firm market have included the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), former SEC commissioners, academic researchers, and think-tank scholars.”16 A major
concern about proxy advisors has been the presence of conflicts of interest, which is the focus of
this paper.

Conflicts of Interest

Gary Retelny and Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., “ISS Senate Hearing Statement,” The Harvard Law
School Forum on Corporate Governance ISS Senate Hearing Statement Comments, July 12, 2018,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/12/iss-senate-hearing-statement/)
16
See 5
15
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According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “T]he business model of the dominant
proxy advisory firm—Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)—has been the most commonly
cited potential conflict. Specifically, ISS advises institutional investors how to vote proxies and
provides consulting services to corporations seeking to improve their corporate governance.
Critics contend that corporations could feel obligated to retain ISS’s consulting services in order
to obtain favorable vote recommendations.” 17 In fact, a concept release from the SEC mentioned
that an issuer “may purchase consulting services from the proxy advisory firm in an effort to
garner the firm’s support for the issuer when the voting recommendations are made”18

Contribution of Research

The Related Works section of this paper discusses much of the progress that has been made in
relation to the effects of proxy advisors and, specifically, conflicts of interested associated with
them. Researchers have focused on understanding the level of influence of proxy advisors ,
agency theory associated with proxy firms, the factors that influence proxy firms’
recommendations, and effect of new entrants in the industry. This research, however, seeks to
measure the impact of perceptions of conflict of interest on shareholder value. Proxy advisory
firms are notoriously opaque, so there has not been much research into empirical cases of
conflicts of interest. It is not possible to perfectly measure a conflict of interest without ISS’
confidential data, but the analysis of excess return could capture investor perceptions.

17

See 1
“Securities and Exchange Commission - SEC.gov.” Accessed May 4, 2020.
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495fr.pdf.
18
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Methodology
Data

The paper’s initial sample consists of all firms included in the S&P 500 index during 2020. The
datasets used for this paper include ISS Voting Analytics – Company Vote Results US, Beta
Suite by WRDS, and ISS Voting Analytics – Mutual Fund Vote Records. While ISS’ voting
recommendations are readily accessible, Glass Lewis does not have a similar public database. To
get a historical record of Glass Lewis voting recommendations, this paper uses mutual fund
voting records in a method similar to that of Larcker, McCall and Ormazabal19. So, this paper
generates a subset of Glass Lewis voting recommendations, by using Form N-PX voting records
of Neuberger Berman, a fund that disclosed it’s “guidelines adopt the voting recommendations of
Glass Lewis’ in Form N-CSR documents from 2013 to 2017.20 This limits available data to
annual meetings that Neuberger Berman voted on. The paper uses ISS Voting Analytics –
Company Vote Results to generate ballot-level data for meetings from 2013 to 2017 for all
current S&P 500 firms. The most relevant columns are: ‘MeetingID,’ ‘MGMTRec,’
‘voteResult,’ ‘ticker,’ and ‘ISSrec’. The paper uses ISS Voting Analytics to generate ballot-level
data for Neuberger Berman’s (InstitutionID= 5102137) voting history from 2013 to 2017. The
most relevant columns are: ‘MeetingID’, ‘MgtRec’, and ‘FundVote’. Additionally, this paper
uses Beta Suite by WRDS to generate daily excess return data for all current members of the
S&P 500 index ranging from 2013 to 2017. The Market model method is to calculate excess
returns (which are expressed as log returns), with an estimation window of 252 days and a
Larcker et al., “Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms,” SSRN, July 19, 2012,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101453)
20
For ex) 2017: https://sec.report/Document/0000898432-17-000016/
19
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minimum window of 126 days. The paper then uses Python to consolidate the data on a meetinglevel basis. This is done by matching the Neuberger Berman vote records and the S&P 500 ballot
results on ‘MeetingID’. From there, the paper matches the meeting data with the stock return
data by using the ‘ticker’ and ‘MeetingDate’. The paper creates additional columns based on the
voting outcome:
‘ISS Fully Supported Management’ : (True/False)
‘GL Fully Supported Management’ : (True/False)
‘All Results Favored Management’ : (True/False)

These variables are generated for each meeting by checking relevant information for all the
ballots in a meeting. There is a check for whether elements of ‘ISSrec’ correspond exactly to
elements of ‘MGMTRec’, a check for whether elements of ‘FundVote’ correspond exactly to
‘MgtRec’, and a check for whether elements of ‘voteResult’ correspond exactly to ‘MgtRec’.

Based on these 3 True/False variables, 8 voting scenarios were constructed:

Scenario 1 = ISS & GL & Results

Scenario 2 = ISS & GL & ! Results

*Scenario 3 = ISS & !GL & Results

Scenario 4 = ISS & !GL & !Results

Scenario 5 = !ISS & GL & Results
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Scenario 6 = !ISS & GL & !Results

Scenario 7 = !ISS & !GL & Results

Scenario 8 = !ISS & !GL & !Results

*Scenario 3 represents the Conflict Scenario (an additional variable is established as well:
Perceived_Conflict = True, if “Scenario” is “Scenario 3”, Perceived _Conflict = False otherwise)

ISS, GL, and Results are abbreviations for ISS Fully Supported Management, Glass Lewis Fully
Supported Management, and All Results Favored Management. The “!” indicates falsehood. The
final sample size was 1,366 annual meetings.

Identification of Meetings that Suggested Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest are difficult to explicitly identify due to the fact that ISS does not release its
ICS client list and we do not know which ballots may have been swayed by the proxy advisor’s
relationship with the management. However, stock market reaction is often driven by
perceptions, so I attempt to identify the conditions a wary institutional investor would find the
most likely to indicate a value-destroying conflict of interest. I identify this situation as a meeting
where ISS fully supported management, Glass Lewis did not fully support management, and all
results favored management. The paper assumes that some investors believe favoritism toward
management by ISS accounts for the divergence from Glass Lewis, which only serves
shareholders. The paper further assumes that investors believe the success of management in
these scenarios would destroy shareholder value.
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Methods
Regression Procedure
The paper conducts OLS regression analysis in the form of the following equation:
Predicted Abnormal Stock Return on Meeting Date = B_0 + B_1 * Perceived_Conflict[False]
Perceived_Conflict[False] is an indicator variable that is equal to 0 when the aforementioned
conflict conditions are met: ISS fully supports management, GL does not fully support
management, and all results favored management. The indicator variable is 1 otherwise. This
form of regression implies that intercept B_0 is the mean predicted abnormal return for meetings
with a conflict present and that B_1 is the difference between the mean abnormal return for
meetings without a conflict against meetings with a conflict.
T-test of Excess Returns for Meetings with a Perceived ISS Conflict of Interest
This paper examines the impact on shareholder value of annual meetings with voting outcomes
that indicate a conflict of interest stemming from ISS Consulting Services. To estimate this
effect, the paper conducts a t-test of equality to 0 for the mean excess return experienced by a
firm on meeting days that have the aforementioned ‘suspicious’ characteristics: ISS fully
supported management, Glass Lewis did not fully support management, and all results favored
management. In addition to conducting a t-test of equality to 0 for mean excess return on the
event date (the meeting date), this paper conducts additional analysis to gain insight on the effect
of these meetings relative to normal trading days. The paper examines and conducts t-tests of
equality to 0 on the average excess returns observed in the 4 trading days before the meeting and
the 4 trading days after for meetings with a perceived ISS Conflict of Interest. This analysis
allows for a broader understanding of the significance of of events by juxtaposing nearby
observed excess returns.
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Results and Discussion
Regression of Excess Return on PercievedConflict = True

This paper measures the impact on shareholder value of annual meetings with voting outcomes
that indicate a conflict of interest stemming from ISS Consulting Services. To estimate this
effect, the paper examines excess stock market reaction on a firm’s meeting date and whether a
meeting was classified as PercievedConflict = True.

PercievedConflict = True when ISS_Fully_Supported_Management = True,
GL_Fully_Supported_Management = False, and All_Results_Favored_Mangement = True.

These scenarios are isolated because there has been widespread speculation among investors,
regulators, and public officials, that ISS is particularly affected by conflicts of interest due to the
firm’s consulting business. If investors thought this way, the stock market reaction to meetings
that could reflect this conflict should, on average, be statistically negative. Meetings that would
most likely reflect this particular conflict of interest harming investors would be meetings where
ISS fully supports management, Glass Lewis does not fully support management, and all the
ballot results favor management. The correlation between ISS recommendations and Glass Lewis
recommendations is very high, so cases where there is a divergence could lead investors to
suspect a conflict of interest. Moreover, the excess return for a meeting impacted by this conflict
of interest could be negative because investors view one or more of the ballots passed as value
destroying. ISS’s alignment with management on what investors perceive to be value destroying
ballots could signify a conflict of interest.
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The paper examines the market reaction to meetings that have characteristics signifying an ISS
conflict of interest. The dependent variable, excessReturn, is the daily excess return on the
meeting date for each firm computed based on the CAPM market model. The coefficients of the
risk factors are estimated using daily data over a period of a 252 day estimation window. To test
whether the stock market reaction to shareholder meetings is associated with characteristics that
signify an ISS conflict of interest, the paper regress excess returns on Perceived_Conflict.
excessReturn = δ0 + δ1 * Perceived_Conflict [True]

Table 1 Estimated dummy coefficients for Regression of Excess Return on Perceived_Conflict

Parameter

Estimate

Std Error

t-statistic

P-value

Intercept

-0.063969

0.035889

-1.78

0.0749*

Perceived_Conflict[True]

-0.089129

0.085822

-1.04

0.2992

Mean of excess returns = -0.07956

R-squared = 0.00077

F Ratio = 1.0785

Root Mean Square Error = 1.220232

Adjusted R-squared = 5.61e-5

Prob > F = 0.2992

Table 1 shows that the estimated coefficient for Perceived_Conflict [True] is -.089129 (t-stat = 1.04), which indicates a perceived conflict having a negative impact on shareholder value, but
the estimate is not statistically significant. The intercept’s estimate coefficient is -0.102857,
which is statistically different from zero at α = .1 (t-stat = -1.78). These results show a weak
negative relationship: meetings with a perceived ISS conflict of interest lead to excess returns on
the day of the meeting that are, on average, 0.089% lower than meetings without the perceived
conflict (which are, on average, -0.064%).
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T-test for mean excess return when PercievedConflict = True
This paper examines the impact on shareholder value of annual meetings with voting outcomes
that indicate a conflict of interest stemming from ISS Consulting Services. To estimate this
effect, the paper conducts a t-test for the mean excess return experienced by a firm on meeting
days that have the aforementioned characteristics: ISS fully supported management, Glass Lewis
did not fully support management, and all results favored management. In our sample, the mean
excess return on a meeting day with those characteristics is -0.154144% and a two-sided t-test
for that excess return being 0 yields a t-stat of -1.9194 and p-value of 0.0561. (A one-sided test
for the mean excess return yields p-value of 0.0281). These results suggest that annual meetings
with voting outcomes that indicate a conflict of interest stemming from ISS Consulting Services
lead to a decrease in shareholder value. Additionally, in Table 2, this paper conducts an analysis
of excess returns (calculated the same way as previously described) in the 4 trading days leading
up to the meeting and the 4 trading days after the meeting. None of the excess returns on these
days are significantly different from 0. The excess return is calculated on a daily basis and the
event window is the day of the meeting because, unlike other events which may occur after
trading day close, annual meetings typically occur between 9am-11am ET.
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Table 2 Average Abnormal Returns & t-values of stocks with Perceived Conflicts of Interest

Before Proxy Vote

After Proxy Vote

Days

AAR

t-test

Days

AAR

t-test

-4

0.0521247

0.4838

0

0.154144

-1.9194*

-3

-0.0720924

-0.7298

1

-0.0385

-0.5178

-2

-0.013891

-0.1469

2

-0.0769

-0.9258

-1

0.075205

0.8767

3

-0.0687

-1.0383

0

0.154144

-1.9194*

4

0.02371

0.3274

Conclusion
Proxy advisory firms have gained significant influence in recent history. Their effects on
corporate governance cannot be understated, so it is important that shareholders gather more
information about these firms, their methods, and potential conflicts if interest. Without a
publicly disclosed list of relationships, it is impossible for the investor public to understand the
impact proxy advisory firms can have on shareholder value. However, this research has shown at
least a few interesting observations about shareholder voting outcomes. This paper finds that the
excess return on the meeting date for a suspected conflict scenario is statistically negative, thus
decreasing shareholder value. Pending future regulations on relationship disclosure requirements,
it may be possible to accurately estimate the impact of conflicts of interest. Until then,
institutional investors ought to be wary of the advice they pay for.
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Related work

There is a significant body of literature on corporate governance issues related to proxy advisory
firms. Several papers document the significant influence proxy firms have on shareholder voting
patterns in several settings. Moreover, there has been research focusing on the existence and
potential sources of conflicts of interest in proxy firms. While many researchers have determined
that proxy firms have a substantial impact on shareholder voting, there has not been exhaustive
empirical research on the negative effect of conflicts of interest within the industry.

In their Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, Larcker, McCall, and
Ormazabal investigate the “economic consequences of institutional investors outsourcing
research and voting decisions on matters submitted to a vote of public company shareholders to
proxy advisory firms.” They primarily analyze data from companies within the Russell 3000, and
they specifically look into shareholder say-on-pay voting. The choice of examining say-on-pay
voting was driven by the recent implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, which required firms to
annually vote on executive compensation. Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal find that, consistent
with other research, proxy advisory firms have a significant impact on voting outcomes for sayon-pay matters. Additionally, they find that many firms will alter their compensation programs
ahead of a formal vote in a way that is expected to align with commonly-held preferences by
proxy advisory firms. Moreover, Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal determine that the stock
market reaction to those compensation changes are statistically negative. Their results imply that
the outsourcing of shareholder voting to proxy advisory firms decreases shareholder value.
While their research documents the negative influence of proxy advisory firms, they do not focus
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on the conflicts of interest present within certain proxy firms. Instead, they identify the
“confluence of free rider problems in the voting decision, regulation of voting in institutional
investors, and the decision by the SEC to regard proxy advisor policies as appropriate for
purposes of institutional investor compliance with regulation” as the source of proxy advisors’
negative impact on shareholder value.

In his Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory
Industry, Li claims to have “the first paper seeking to empirically examine whether and when
conflicts of interest can arise from serving both shareholders and issuers.” His approach focuses
on analyzing how recommendations by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) change when
Glass Lewis starts covering a particular firm. His research focuses on the fact that ISS provides
advisory services to institutional shareholders as well as consulting services to some
management teams, while Glass Lewis only provides advisory services to institutional
shareholders. So, he expects that when ISS is in an uncompetitive market (where they are the
only one giving a recommendation), they are more likely to be biased in favor of the clients that
they provide consulting services to due to their conflicts of interest. As evidence of this, he

determines that after Glass Lewis starts covering one of these companies, ISS becomes less
“friendly” to the firm. This implies that shareholders will more heavily scrutinize a
recommendation from ISS in the event that the ISS recommendation disagrees with that of Glass
Lewis (which overall tends to be less “friendly” to firms). So, Li asserts that “conflicts of interest
are a real concern in the proxy advisory industry, and increasing competition can help to alleviate
them to a certain extent.”
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In their article The power of proxy advisors: Myth or reality, Choi, Fisch, and Kahan analyze the
“significance of voting recommendations issued by four proxy advisory firms in connection with
uncontested director elections.” They determine that these firms do have a meaningful impact on
shareholder voting. They identify Institutional Shareholders Services and Glass Lewis as the
most and second most powerful proxy advisory firms (respectively). More specifically they
estimate that “an ISS recommendation shifts 6%-10% of shareholder votes.” Additionally, they
conclude that “a major component of ISS’s influence stems from its role as an information agent,
aggregating factors that its subscribers consider important.” Their research serves as a seminal
piece, identifying the significant impact proxy firms have on shareholder voting.

In their article Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters, Malenko
and Malenko analyze how proxy advisors affect corporate decision-making. They examine
several regulatory proposals on proxy advisors and conclude that “some suggested policies, such
as reducing proxy advisors’ market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative
effects.” Moreover, they provide an overview of the rise in proxy advisory firms from a policy
standpoint. They identify the 2003 SEC rule requiring mutual funds to vote in their clients’ best
interests as a reason for the popularity of proxy advisory firms. Additionally, they credit the
“growth in the volume and complexity” of corporate governance issues as a source of increased
demand for the services. Their research presents a comprehensive overview of the proxy
advisory firm industry.

Ma and Xiong, in their Information Bias in the Proxy Advisory Market, focus on the bias in the
information sold by proxy advisory firms. They identify that “the proxy advisor provides
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both unbiased and desirable voting advice when it has no conflicts of interest.” However, “in
general, the proxy advisor sends biased voting advice, and there is no inherent link between
information bias and desirability.” From a theoretical perspective, their article shows that there is
the possibility for proxy advisory firms to increase shareholder value so long as “the nature of
the shareholder voting is cooperative” and “the information seller in the voting context will not
dilute the value of information.”

Hayne and Vance, in their Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field
Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors, analyze whether proxy
advisory firms serve primarily as information providers or have a direct influence on firms’
executive compensation practices. They perform a field study and determine that proxy advisory
firms play both roles: “we find that Pas are perceived as both information intermediaries and
agenda setters and that these roles provide leverage to enable Pas to exercise significant
influence over executive pay practices.” In many cases, there is evidence that boards yield to
proxy advisory firms’ “best practices” even “in the absence of overt PA scrutiny or negative
shareholder votes.” Moreover, they identify that proxy advisory firms suffer from conflicts of
interest and do not thoroughly analyze each case, instead opting for a “one-size-fits-all
approach.” Hayne and Vance’s paper significantly contributes to research on the impact of proxy
advisory firms by outlining the sources of their power.
Malenko and Shen quantitatively analyze the extent of proxy advisor’s influence in their paper,
The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design. They
examined data from 2010 to 2011 and found that a negative say-on-pay recommendation from
ISS “leads to a 25 percentage point reduction in say-on-pay voting support.” They quantify the
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causal effect of proxy recommendations by using an ISS cutoff rule and applying a regression
discontinuity design. Their results further underscore the significant influence proxy firms have
on swaying shareholder votes.
In the Government Accountability Office’s Corporate Shareholder Meetings: Issues Relating to
Firms That Advise Institutional Investors on Proxy Voting, several potential sources of conflicts
of interest are identified within proxy advisory firms, specifically ISS. They describe
the aspects of ISS’s business model that potentially generate conflicts of interest: “ISS advises
institutional investor clients on how to vote their proxies and at the same time provides
consulting services to help corporations develop management proposals and improve their
corporate governance.” In the research, it is shown that, despite efforts by ISS to reduce that
conflict of interest, “some industry analysts [they] contacted said there remains reason to
question the steps’ effectiveness.” Additionally, the paper identifies several other areas of
potential conflicts of interest, including proxy firms having “ownership interest” in or serving on
the board of companies they are covering. This paper serves as a significant overview of
conflicts of interest within proxy firms.

Rather than solely focusing on proxy advisory firms, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe, in their paper,
The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, detail the impact
of corporate governance, in general, on shareholder value. They apply a regression model on
companies within the S&P1500 to find that passing a governance provision “generates a 1.3%
abnormal return on the day of the vote.” They also determine the impact of corporate governance
decisions on long term shareholder value. Their research serves to highlight the significant
influence corporate governance decisions have on shareholder value.
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In their Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, Choi, Fisch, and Kahan examine the
decision-making processes of several proxy advisory firms and identify how the structure could
lead to such firms pursuing their own agenda. They find that there are vast differences between
the criteria focused on by four prominent firms – Institutional Shareholder Services, Glass
Lewis, PROXY Governance, and Egan-Jones. They determine that “ISS focuses on governancerelated factors, PG on compensation-related factors, GL on audit/disclosure- related factors, and
EJ on an eclectic mix of factors.” However, the authors identify that the differences between
proxy firms may not be well understood by investors. They determine that “if these differences
are not known, then proxy advisors may lack accountability for—and can pursue their own
agenda in making—their voting recommendations, thereby impairing the effectiveness of the
shareholder franchise.” This research highlights how proxy firms’ opaque decision-making
processes could encourage conflicts of interest.

The body of literature on proxy advisors clearly identifies the outsized influence such firms
exhibit. While progress has been made on identifying the presence of conflicts of interest, there
has not been exhaustive research into the impact of such conflicts of interest on shareholder
value.
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